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The principles underlying evolutionary psychology suggest an approach to Law and 
Economics that tends to reject top-down policy making and encourages a bottom-up 
stance, whereby rules lead to behavioral routines that are consistent with individuals’ 
shared psychological patterns.  
  The view proposed here is fruitful from a methodological perspective, in that it allows 
a new classification of societies, new insight on their prospects for economic growth, an 
innovative appreciation of the chances for successful transition in areas that have 




(*) I am very grateful to Simon Teitel for his useful comments on a preliminary draft of 
this work. Previous versions of this paper were presented at the New York Law 
School’s Center for International Law and at the Prague Conference on Political 
Economy. This work is forthcoming in Procesos de Mercado (2006).   3
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1. Orthodox Law and Economics and its inadequacies 
Most economists outside the neoclassical tradition have always been aware of the 
importance of the interaction between legal structures and economic behavior (Sima, 
2004). Consensus has further widened during the last decade, as an increasingly large 
number of mainstream scholars have recognized the need to take rule-making into 
account, either as a component of their models or as a constraint to be dealt with before 
models are designed and/or tested. In the end, two different approaches have emerged 
within the realm of economic analysis. One has tended to explain individual behavior as 
the result of the existing rules of the game or as the effort to alter or preserve such rules, 
following personal or group interests. The other has emphasized the study of the 
mechanisms through which given sets of formal and informal rules - traditions, 
conventions, norms, laws - affect transactions costs, and thus enhance or stifle desirable 
cooperation among individuals. The former is known as institutional economics, the 
latter as ‘law and economics’ (L&E)
1.  
                                                 
1 The legal tradition tends to emphasize other aspects, such as the consequences of judicial decisions with 
respect to efficiency and fairness. Put differently, whereas economists view law and economics as a 
means to understand people’s behavior, lawyers are inclined to consider this discipline as a tool that 
enables them to better appreciate the meaning and consequences of law making. See in particular 
Medema (2005) for an in-depth discussion on the economic and legal approaches, which also reflects the 
debate between the old and the new L&E schools. 
  On the other hand, the so-called ‘political economy’ approach will be ignored in this article. Since 
political economy studies the features of policy making as a function of institutional design, it differs 
from L&E, which focuses on property right assignments. And it also differs from institutional economics, 
which focuses on the nature and dynamics of institutions, rather than on the modeling of political 
arrangements so as to pursue pre-defined goals.    4
Surely, the border between institutional economics and L&E is not always clear-
cut, and one might rightly argue that the rules according to which individuals behave are 
themselves the result of human action. Still, since the 1930s institutional economics and 
L&E have developed along somewhat independent tracks. Institutional economics has 
emphasized the economics of culture and of rent seeking. It has generated important 
descriptive and explanatory results, but rather modest normative recipes.  
On the other hand, L&E has often taken the nature and goals of economic 
activity for granted; and focused on how to achieve such goals by defining and 
managing property rights. Its normative implications have been of consequence, even if 
at odds with the praxeological foundations of a free-market system
2. In fact, traditional 
L&E owes much of its success to its rigorous explanations of bad economic 
performance, even when apparently good textbooks recipes are applied. In particular, 
the L&E solution tends to be presented as a package shaped around three pillars. First, 
success obtains only when the rule-of-law is enforced by a group of Hayekian 
legislators
3 supported by an efficient and committed state bureaucracy. Second, 
independent and omniscient judiciary bodies are to watch over and solve alleged market 
failures
4, possibly through a number of state organizations reproduced after neoclassical 
blueprints. Finally, the L&E approach would offer valuable guidelines to modify 
property-right assignments, either according to Chicago-style criteria, so as to 
approximate the outcome one would have observed in a world with zero transactions 
costs; or to Yale-style principles, whereby some notion of social fairness is also 
complied with.  
                                                 
2 See Block (1977) for the ‘immoral implications Demsetz draws from Coases’s view of property’. 
Indeed, the recent constructivist developments in L&E have frequently departed from the principles of its 
forerunners, who were closer to the late nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century reactions to legal 
formalism (Medema 2005). 
3 Following Hayek (1960), a fair political system attributes a large role to state action, which protects 
individual freedom, but also provides for a large number of goods and services. Legal scholars and/or 
philosophical scientists would take care of law making, so as to evaluate and restrain abuses by the state 
and monitor infringements on individual liberty.  
4 As argued in Nicita and Pagano (2007), the mainstream ‘approach had an un-Coasean flavour. The 
Nirvana hypothesis had not been removed, but simply shifted from market to judges and this contradicted 
the Coasean insight that all institutions were costly and no institutional Nirvana existed’. This applies to 
Posner, who undertakes to maximize social wealth – whatever that means; and to Demsetz, who aims at 
minimizing transactions costs.    5
Not surprisingly, L&E became a much welcome complement to mainstream 
normative economics. It took care of transactions costs, a well-known soft spot of 
orthodox textbooks dealing with policy-making. At the same time, it suited the 
understandable desire to shape an ideal situation where income growth was assured by 
well-regulated market transactions. Thus, it encouraged much of the profession to 
believe in the inevitability of growth and development for those countries equipped with 
the rules and agencies suitable to attract new and significant amounts of fixed capital 
and to absorb outside technologies.  
A substantial body of literature has now emphasized that the traditional L&E 
recipe suffers from a number of important weaknesses. From a methodological 
viewpoint, it relies heavily on the (im)possibility of assessing and measuring individual 
preferences, without which modifying property rights would make little sense. 
Furthermore, it assumes that suitable contracts always take place and that when they 
don’t, exceedingly high transactions costs are the explanation. Indeed, there is plenty of 
evidence that this hypothesis is far stretched. On the one hand the preferences of the 
potential sellers often differ from those of the potential buyers
5. On the other it tends to 
belittle the most important transactions costs, which consists of a biased and inefficient 
judiciary system (Opper, 2005): training the judges may help, but is only part of the 
solution. From a substantive viewpoint, by applying L&E procedures the judge or the 
legislator can merely replace the agents’ preferences with his own assessment of their 
preferences. Or disregard their preferences altogether and replace them with his own, 
which are necessarily arbitrary, even when the legislators’ personal or group interests 
are heroically assumed away
6.  
Either way, in this context the foundations of the judge’s action do not seem 
beyond dispute. The moral ground that justifies the overruling of individual preferences 
is shaky, for it is hard to conceive an acceptable criterion through which preferences can 
be ranked across individuals. In addition, lawmakers hardly ever operate in a vacuum 
                                                 
5 See for instance Block (1977). That also applies to goods that do not generate immediate streams of 
utility. The economic literature has frequently referred to the fact that agents often choose different means 
to pursue the same ends as a proof of ‘irrationality’. More aptly, Nussbaum (1997) has pointed out that 
these puzzles are generated by the poor mainstream definition of individual preferences, which omits to 
mention emotional components.  
6 See for instance Bernstein (2005, pp. 109-112).    6
when they define and assign property rights. Should goods be available because nobody 
previously thought they were of any use, then the rule of the first occupant/user applies. 
Neither L&E prescriptions, nor judges have much to add. On the other hand, goods that 
cannot be accessed or used without aggressing a counterpart reflect a situation where 
somebody else de facto owns them. Hence, all normative prescriptions designed to 
enhance an optimal allocation of rights – whatever that may mean – are in fact a 





2. The behavioral alternative 
The behavioral approach offers a different perspective on norms and economic action 
by focusing on individual choices, rather than outcomes
8. As a consequence, it avoids 
all assumptions about rationality, a crucial weakness of the neoclassical vision of law 
and economics. Instead, it takes into account ‘bounded rationality, bounded willpower 
and bounded self-interest’ (Jolls, Sunstein and Thaler 1998, p.1476) and acknowledges 
that altruism, Mandevillian sociability, envy and fairness, pride, also characterize 
individuals’ preferences. Thus, decision-making routines serve the purpose of reducing 
information costs, uncertainty and thinking time. Put differently, behavioral law and 
economics does not aim at producing rules and legitimizing assignments or procedures 
that lead to some kind of efficiency determined in terms of income streams. Rather, it 
insists on formulating rules that are desirable because they stem from evolution by 
                                                 
7 Parisi and Klick (2003) make the case for a functionalist version of law and economics. They attempt to 
reconcile L&E with a free-market perspective by recommending general rules so as ‘to induce individuals 
to internalize the effects of their private activities, as well as […] to reveal their true preferences in 
situations where collective decisions must be made’ (p.2).  
8 The functional approach also claims to be concerned with efficient procedures, rather than outcomes. 
This claim is not fully persuasive, though. In fact, two possibilities may occur. Either the quality of a 
procedure is assessed according to the features of the outcome it leads to. If so, the emphasis on 
procedures is fictitious and the difference between the orthodox and the functional view becomes rather 
thin. Or the quality of the procedure is judged according to the institutional environment within which 
individuals choose. If so, functional Law and Economics would be the normative side of the new 
institutional economics.    7
natural selection (Jones, 2000)
9, are consistent with the shared values of a community 
and allow for differences in personal ethical standards. Of course, this begs two 
important questions.  
First, one should identify the role of the individual with respect to the 
community. For instance, in a free society the individual has a right to exemptions 
whenever a rule interferes with his/her personal liberty (the freedom from coercion). 
But in most social frameworks the rules of the game are different from those of a free 
society, and one has to assess when opting out is permitted. Second, people’s 
preferences often display changes in needs and perceptions, which are sometimes 
described as behavioral inconsistencies and possibly lead to extreme conclusions: Either 
rules are changed and re-assessed on a daily basis in order to take into account all these 
changes; or rules are just a short list of principles, broad enough not to be changed for 
long periods of time and precise enough not to allow those in charge of enforcing them 




3. The purpose of law and economics reassessed 
The contrast between the orthodox and the behavioral approaches is surely important 
from a positive standpoint, since it highlights the need to take into account ‘irrational 
human behavior’ when trying to understand social phenomena. Of course, that also 
affects the evaluation of rules, since the way people react to the incentive systems 
defined by rules depends on the features of each individual.   
Put differently, mainstream L&E starts out by defining a measurable goal 
(achieving allocation efficiency, minimizing criminal behavior, attaining fair 
distribution of income) and analyses the most suitable way to modify and enforce either 
property rights or rules in order to obtain predefined objectives. Not surprisingly, 
preferences and persistent behaviour are considered as one (Stigler and Becker, 1977): 
                                                 
9 Of course, ‘This is not at all the same thing as claiming (as some critics incorrectly presume that those 
who invoke biology automatically claim) that all biological predispositions are fortunate, simply because 
they have evolved’. (Jones 2000, p. 2088).  
10 That might contribute to explaining why bad legislation abounds in societies that do not operate 
according to natural law, but to a historicist approach. Politicians necessarily follow the whims of the   8
that is, preferences are assumed to be constant and human behaviour to reflect the most 
efficient way to satisfy given and stable preferences. In the end policy action is justified 
as long as it reduces alleged market failures. Preferences can actually be ignored 
altogether (Stigler and Becker 1977), for apparent differences are just the product of 
different incentive systems, which in turn are determined by property rights and 
transaction costs
11.  
On the other hand, the behavioural perspective relies heavily on evolutionary 
psychology, which suggests a much more cautious view towards policy-making and the 
evaluation of results. It claims that behavioral routines follow from psychological 
patterns that evolve through century-long experiences and trial and error processes. 
Contrary to the standard L&E view, patterns are not constant and routines do not 
depend on transaction costs only. Instead, the origin of their differences is historical 
(culture)
12, rather than technocratic. More precisely, individuals are not machines that 
come to life and follow their pre-programmed instructions in spite of the environmental 
conditions, as most cognitive psychologists tend to assume. Nor are they blocs of clay 
moulded by the external conditions, as the radical-behavioural school would argue. 
Instead, according to the evolutionary approach, human behaviour is the outcome of a 
lengthy process of adaptation, a frame of mind that turned out to be suitable to solve or 
avoid a problem. The analysis of the interaction between the way we are and the stimuli 
we are exposed to is thus key to understanding human action and society (see for 
instance Buss 2004). When mutually compatible, routines consolidate in social norms, 
informal rules. Indeed, social interaction is framed by such informal norms (Ellickson 
1991). Formal rules are necessary only when informal conventions are misunderstood, 
or when they break down; and when the system of sanctions typical of the informal 
                                                                                                                                               
public they represent. And they also take advantage of short-lived emotions to advance rent-seekers’ 
interests.  
11 Hence, the ethics of policy making orbits about the dynamics of transaction costs. The way to 
historicism is wide-open once again.  
12 See for instance Hofstede (1991 [2003]), who classifies different cultural patterns according to four 
parameters and provides empirical evidence. Quite rightly, Hofstede makes a distinction between culture 
(also defined as the software of the mind), which is acquired in early age; and human nature, which is 
genetically inherited. This article refers to both at the same time by referring to “psychologically 
patterns”, which therefore include both inherited traits and young-age learning.    9
code turns out to be inadequate. As a result, three sets of arguments are put forward 
from a behavioral standpoint.  
First, law-making should be restricted to filling the gaps of spontaneous social 
interaction. For instance, that applies to the definition of sanctions, especially when 
transactions involve agents who do not belong to the same (relatively small) 
community. Or to default rules when the interpretation of the contractual agreement 
turns out to be questionable, especially in cases where the pertinent informal rule is far 
from certain or consolidated in common use. This was indeed the historical role of 
Common Law, as argued in Zywicki (2003, p.1622). Second, law-making could be 
welcome in the presence of imperfect behavioral updating. As already observed by 
Hayek (1960 [1978, p.286] and 1973 [1983, pp.88-89]) when advocating active rule-
making, behavioral patterns evolve gradually, definitely slower than the environment 
within which individuals operate, both from a technological and an institutional 
viewpoint
13. As a consequence, routines might become outdated quickly. The actions 
that follow from such obsolete routines may no longer be appropriate to meet current 
preferences. If so, law-making could then anticipate behavioral evolution, provided – 
surely a strong assumption – that the law-makers are equipped with prophetic abilities 
or characterized by relatively fast evolutionary patterns that are known to anticipate 
general behavior. Finally, there remains room for legal innovation, too. New routines do 
not necessarily come to the surface by chance. And they are all the time enhanced by 
new ideas, proposals, contractual varieties. Thus, experimental law-making should be 
prominent and always allow for some kind of opting-out, so that (natural) selection - 
one of the pillars of the evolutionary approach - can take place.  
All that of course assumes that policy-making is indeed legitimate. That is not 
warranted, though. For the behavioral standpoint shows that if one accepts that formal 
norms must serve social interaction, and that the individuals belong to a society for geo-
political reasons
14, other questions deserve to be answered even before policies become 
an option. As global interaction intensifies and local communities grow to be 
                                                 
13 Globalization is a prime example in this context, as it includes a dramatic fall in transportation and 
communication costs, as well as in tariff and non-tariff barriers.  
14 In this case the notion of a ‘society’ coincides with that of a ‘country’. This is the area where a formal 
institutional framework (a set codified of laws) applies.    10
increasingly porous – possibly falling apart altogether - it becomes rather difficult to 
maintain that a group of individuals share the same objectives or the same psychological 
patterns just because they share the same capital city. Put differently, it might not be 





4. From law and economics to development and transition 
In the previous paragraphs it has been claimed that L&E offers rather questionable 
guidelines for policy-making. By and large the argument is negative, i.e. normative 
action would violate individual preferences and be arbitrary. In the end it reveals 
teleological ambitions without sound criteria to single out an objective. The practical 
consequences can be detected in the so-called transition and developing countries, 
where the old norms have broken down or are deemed less than appropriate, and new 
norms seem to be in demand.  
If culture matters and violent shocks like wars or revolutions are ignored, rules 
usually change over long periods of time – they are indeed evolutionary phenomena that 
follow a process similar to natural selection. New rules of the game will come to the 
surface gradually, as the old ones become obsolete. Surely, from a cultural viewpoint 
there is little or no need for L&E intervention. In other cases, however, change is rapid, 
for instance when the old formal rules are invalidated in the aftermath of a political 
crisis – say, when a dictator loses power or a regime collapses. Even in this case, 
however, L&E can be disappointing, for one can hardly know where a society is 
heading or, more aptly, which new behavioral routines are going to replace the old ones. 
For sure, and contrary to much policy advice coming from all directions, if one believes 
that psychological patterns are a cumulative process whereby today’s blueprints are 
somehow dependent on yesterday’s guidelines, developing and transition societies will 
                                                 
15 The logical problem can be presented as follows. Small communities with strict internal behavioral 
codes may be thought to represent an ideal society for the purpose of law and economics: shared 
objectives and shared behavioral evolution. But at the same time they present little scope for any L&E 
intervention, since within this framework informal rules would prevail and actually satisfy all the 
normative needs. On the other hand, in larger and more open societies coordination problems may be 
more serious and difficult to solve. Then, the very notion of society loses its original meaning. As a 
consequence coercive interference loses legitimacy, too.    11
never reproduce the Western model, unless in the very long run and under rather 
restrictive hypotheses. At most one can hope that foreign institutions be imported, 
modified, adapted and harmonized with the existing rules of the game: outright 
substitution would be a recipe for failure (Sachs et al., 2000; Berkowitz et al., 2003).  
There are even reasons to believe that in some cases transition and development 
processes should be left in the hands of at least some among those who operated the old 
system. This applies when the old system has been in place long enough to generate 
behavioral routines that have been absorbed into psychological patterns, thereby leading 
to path-dependence and inertia
16. Under such circumstances, the existing psychological 
patterns do not necessarly disappear overnight when the old political system breaks 
down. On the contrary, they often remain in place and change very slowly through 
repeated interaction, towards good or bad outcomes. If so, the new routines to be 
enforced are successful only if they can build on the incumbent psychological patterns.  
In practice, it is here argued that the pace of evolution can accelerate and be 
consciously driven towards given goals only if the authorities can provide credible 
commitments based on their understanding and personal records of social interaction 
and can offer expected responses to people’s actions. Agents that operate in a new 
political context are encouraged to be consistent and consolidate new psychological 
patterns only if they know who their counterparts are, are familiar with their conduct 
and know that their counterparts know them.  
On the contrary, top-down institution building can certainly lead to radical 
changes in behavioral routines. But it hardly modifies psychological patterns. Different 
outcomes can materialize, as will be discussed more carefully later. It is however 
already clear that from this perspective even the ideal textbook situation is intrinsically 
inconsistent and bound to fail. For when allegedly-efficient assignments of property 
rights break down current behavioral routines, they destroy the potential reference 
points for the evolving psychological patterns. As a consequence, either the old patterns 
are strengthened for lack of affordable substitute compass reading; and new routines 
develop as a compromise between the efficient rules and the ‘inefficient’ patterns. Or 
                                                 
16 One may thus imagine to classify transition/developing economies according to the combination of 
their behavioral routines and their psychological patterns. The outcome of these combinations determines 
their chances to obtain fast institutional change. This approach may indeed explain the different reactions 
to political change in various parts of the developing world.    12
the allegedly efficient new routines are ignored altogether and the existing behavioral 
practices are left intact (Rapaczynski, 1996). This may help understand why the same 
L&E prescription were expected to generate similar results and in fact gave origin to all 
sorts of different responses.  
 
 
5. The institutional alternatives 
The above also applies to the normative legacy of the (new) institutional economics, 
which maintains that institution building is a necessary requirement for successful 
economic performance, but neglects to emphasize that it has never been sufficient: In 
some cases the incumbent elites successfully resist pressure to reshape the institutional 
context, lest they might lose their privileges and control of power. In other cases the 
new rules and agencies are misused or simply disregarded. For instance, substantial 
parts of the former Soviet bloc and of Sub-Saharan Africa abound with brand new Stock 
Exchanges with little or no stocks to trade.  
Although the lesson has not been yet been learnt in full – several national and 
international agencies keep insisting on top-down institutional design and building - 
less technocratic approaches have recently been re-examined in a more favorable light. 
The basic ideas have been borrowed from the old institutional school (OIE). In 
particular, social interaction is now understood to be the result of extended trial-and-
error processes through which individuals learn how to improve their well being. 
Similarly, it is acknowledged that change does take place following environmental and 
technological conditions. But it is equally recognized that it is slow and based upon past 
experience, the teachings of which are absorbed gradually, as the new behavioural 
routines turn out to be preferable to the old ones and create novel modes of interaction.  
This approach to slow evolution has emphasised the need for consistency 
between codified and implicit norms, i.e. formal and informal rules, according to the 
current terminology (North 1990; Pejovich 1999). Ideally, formal rules should be 
shaped and dictated by informal rules, which serve the purpose of enhancing 
information and reducing transactions costs generated by cheating, opportunism and the 
need for ex post evaluation. When this does not happen, tensions create room for 
discretionary power by lawmakers and law enforcers, raise the transactions costs for the   13
agents, lead to problems of credibility and thus reliability of the exchange system and 
eventually to poor economic performance.  
One may thus conclude with the (old) institutional view that an acceptable legal 
structure must be consistent with the cultural background of a society. In particular, the 
less evident the cultural traits of a community, the less binding the rules should be and 
substantial opting-out possibilities should be available. For instance, contract law 
(including the system of sanctions regarding breach of contract) should then be subject 
to competitive judiciary systems, whereas torts and criminal law should be subject to 
path dependence (precedent).  
 
 
6. Towards an enriched cultural approach 
The Old Institutional approach
17 is of course convincing, in that it is diffucult to claim 
that rules should go against shared moral standards filtered through decades if not 
centuries of social interactions. Even when behavior does not seem to generate 
satisfactory performances, efficiency per se provides little legitimacy to violate 
individual freedom and force agents to accept other behavioral patterns. Following 
Leoni (1961 [1991]), law-making – changing the way human beings behave towards 
desirable patterns – should then be replaced by efforts to find out how people intend to 
behave (law as a discovery process). Hence the role attributed by natural-rights scholars 
to information, trial and error processes, history, traditions. 
Still, the problem with the old institutional economics is that it is a description, 
rather than an explanation of human behavior. At best it depicts how behavior evolves 
when existing routines are confronted with new technological opportunities or new 
historical contexts, whereby path dependence (inertia) breaks down and new ways to 
interact appear - possibly new organizations, too. In particular, two processes can be 
observed. Either the new cultural pattern is molded through a competitive process, so 
that selection favors the most desirable solutions, i.e. those that enhance exchange and 
the acquisition of knowledge. Or the old and new rent-seeking groups cooperate and 
strive to preserve or strengthen their rents. As the literature has emphasized, sometimes 
                                                 
17 Unless specified, the terms ‘old-institutional’ and ‘cultural’ are considered synonymous.    14
the former prevails, sometimes the latter. Much depends on geography, historical 
accident, ideology.  
Put differently, one cannot escape the impression that in the end the explanatory 
element of the cultural view is either residual or tautological. For when human behavior 
is not ‘rational’ or ‘bounded-rational’ in the neoclassical sense, then systematic 
deviations necessarily come from tradition (including prejudice) and personal 
preferences - i.e. culture broadly speaking
18. Similarly, saying that economic 
performance is below expectations because desirable institutional frameworks fail to be 
operational (or don’t exist) is equivalent to saying that violence or tensions between 
formal and informal rules dominate
19. Among other things, this would not be too far 
away from the argument made within the traditional L&E and the neo-institutional 
fields, according to which there is a case for advocating more effective law-enforcement 
and perhaps policies designed to enhance some kind of cultural catch-up. The debate on 
shock therapy and gradualism in transition countries can actually be framed in these 
terms, whereby the former view emphasizes credibility, the latter cultural change. In the 
end what matters are not only the features of the new pattern, but also the capacity to 
accept and act according to the new patterns. This indeed the lesson taught by 
successful slow and fast privatizers in Eastern Europe (quoted in Opper 2005).  
However, the picture may acquire a new shape if the notion of culture is analyzed in 
behavioral terms, that is if one takes into account the fact that individual ‘behavior 
flows from brains that (a) encounter specific environmental stimuli and (b) possess a 
neural architecture that is as importantly shaped by environments as it is by genes’ 
(Jones and Goldsmith 2005, p. 428). Although still developing
20, this conceptual frame 
                                                 
18 Emotions are outside the cultural view, for they are short-lived by definition. When they are systematic, 
they become part of the culture. 
19 As aired earlier on, these tensions weaken the reliability of the whole rule system, with a negative 
effect on growth. 
20 Once one upholds that emotions, ideologies, external environments dominate behavior, then one needs 
a theory in order to explain endogenous behavioral patterns. Unfortunately, the behavioral school is still 
lacking in this respect. A possible alternative is Jacques Lacan’s theorizing of irrational behavior (see 
Schroeder 2000 for a discussion of Lacan’s view within law and economics). Lacan’s approach is also 
consistent with the notion of stable tastes put forward by Stigler and Becker (1977). Still, Lacan’s vision 
seems more apt to explain individual reactions to the outside world, rather than the development of what 
D. North would call ‘belief systems’. This is probably due to the fact that in Lacan’s world there are no 
belief systems altogether, but only ‘desires’ (pursuing a goal such as satisfaction or morality) and ‘drives’ 
(hedonism).    15
shares the OIE view whereby a society develops and prospers when individual 
behavioral routines are compatible and to some extent mutually expected, either because 
agreed upon in advance (say, by means of a contract) or because implicit (shared values, 
informal rules). But it also adds that the relevant shocks are those experienced when 
rapid changes in behavior come about, either because psychological patterns evolve 
quickly, or because those behavioral routines that were imposed on a given 
psychological pattern are being removed before the underlying patterns undergo 
significant change. When this occurs, the new behavioral routines develop along with 
some elements of the superseded routines, and by interacting with the existing patterns. 
More generally, a set of shared principles and behavioral routines (tradition and 
habits) acquire different meanings according to the genetic traits – the psychological 
patterns - they reflect. For instance, a society where genetic traits have developed as a 
consequence of the adoption of exogenous behavioral routines for a long enough time is 
likely to exhibit different features when compared with a society where routines have 
developed from - say - spontaneous interaction among free individuals
21. In this light, 
the term culture acquires different meanings – depending on whether it reflects 
behavioral routines or psychological patterns
22.  In short, the term ‘culture’ lacks power 
as an operational device. As argued above, the concepts of behavioral routines and 
psychological patterns seem to be more useful in that they are able to include a wider 
variety of situations, including those under the remaining headings – non-development, 
oppression and transition.  
 
                                                 
21 One can oppose the case of France (and large areas of continental Europe) to that of England (and the 
Anglo Saxon world). In both cases the notion of the nation state developed as from the late 17th century 
and became an important reference point for the individual. However, in the first case the state was to 
achieve what the individual could not obtain all alone – including some arbitrary notion of the collective 
good, be it collective security or aggressive capabilities. Whereas in the second case the state was 
justified in that it protected individual liberties.  
22 One of the ambiguities is related to the notion of ‘heterogeneous cultures’, which is widely accepted by 
anthropologists, but inevitably creates problems to the economists, who tend to refer to culture in order to 
define a common system of values (or belief systems, as they are sometimes called). From the analytical 
standpoint suggested here the quandary could be solved by observing that heterogeneity refers to the 
presence of different psychological patterns, which may nevertheless lead to shared behavioral routines, 
that is tolerable reactions to given outside stimuli. For instance, most members of a society may not 
approve cheating, but cheating can still be tolerated if it is widely acknowledged that the victim is 
unworthy of a better attitude. The fragility of these cultural systems is then explained by the changes in 
the exogenous incentives, which leave the psychological patterns unchanged, but may modify the 
routines.    16
 
7. The evolutionary notion in practice 
Once the old institutional view is enriched through the behavioral elements outlined 
above, economic development can be appreciated in a new light. This paper considers 
four categories of situations - developed, undeveloped, oppressed and in transition. 
  
Developed countries 
A developed country is here defined as one where behavioral routines are 
consistent with the agents’ psychological patterns (which include preferences as well as 
spontaneous reaction vis-à-vis external stimuli). GDP levels are thus irrelevant. In other 
words, development obtains when the principles underlying the prevailing rules of the 
game are widely accepted. In developed countries these principles or moral standards 
are embedded in the observable behavioral routines and there is no need to reach a 
compromise between morality and psychological patterns. Tensions, if any, concern the 
intensity and consistency with which such criteria are applied. They inevitably turn out 
to be a question of too much or too little redistribution.  
This has a number of implications worthy of notice. First, in developed 
economies the role of the distinction between formal and informal rules weakens. 
Following our definition a developed country can have formal rules that are indeed 
inconsistent with the informal norms. But the very fact that behavioral routines are well 
supported by the psychological patterns implies that formal rules are simply ignored 
and/or considered as an additional transaction cost to reckon with
23. Second, the very 
notion of informal rules becomes less important, for it can apply to different situations. 
For instance, informal rules do develop spontaneously as a result of repeated interaction 
among agents exchanging goods and services and, more generally, acknowledging and 
enforcing property rights. But they can also come to the surface as a reaction to 
distorted institutional situations – say, a totalitarian regime - and yet run against the 
current prevailing psychological patterns. That is what happens when we compromise. 
                                                 
23 For instance, this applies to countries where the so-called underground economy is a substantial share 
of production, as in many European regions. As mentioned in the text, a country is developed if there are 
no tensions between behavioral routines and psychological routines. This does not rule out that formal 
and informal rule differ. But it rules out that such differences generate serious tensions.    17
It then follows that the nature of informal rules does not say much about individuals’ 
preferences and that inconsistencies between formal and informal rules can be ascribed 
to different categories of situations, depending on whether informal rules are the result 
of shared behavioral routines or not.  
 
Undeveloped countries 
According to our analytical framework, in undeveloped countries psychological 
patterns are well adapted to the existing behavioral routines. These, however, are less 
than satisfactory, especially as regards economic performance. Still, under these 
circumstances individuals are unwilling to introduce new incentive systems or change 
the traditional response to the existing institutional stimuli. Put differently, the origin of 
dissatisfaction is not the violation of relative preferences, but simple envy (absolute 
preferences)
24. Thus, in these cases the concept of backwardness involves perception, 
rather than some measure of the living standard. Agents operating in ‘backward 
societies’ do perceive that they are producing well inside the production possibility 
frontier, but are unwilling to take the necessary steps in the required direction. In other 
words, the so-called poverty trap stems from inefficient behavioural routines which are 
however consistent with the software of the mind.  
This allows to conclude that backwardness is a relative notion. No undeveloped 
country would consider itself poor or disgraced unless its residents could compare their 
living standards with those of other countries
25. Should dissatisfaction be an absolute 
notion, it would be generated by either undesirable behavioral routines, or evolving 
genetic patterns. If that were the case, however, the country would fall in the 
‘oppressed’ category, to be explained below.   
                                                 
24 Absolute preferences refer to what people would like to have and with what intensity (e.g. more 
holidays or a better car). Of course, the intensity of our desires depends on how realistic they are and on 
how much satisfaction the desired goods and services are expected to provide. Instead, relative 
preferences are related to choice, i.e. they depend on being aware that choosing to consume one unit of X 
today implies giving up some amount of Y, today or in the future.  
25 This view is confirmed if one compares some rich Western countries in the XIX century with some of 
today’s countries with similar GDP per-capita. GDP per-capita in the Netherlands in 1820 was about 
1,550 dollars (at 1990 constant prices). Still the Dutch considered themselves rich, whereas today’s 
Egyptians and Pakistanis (with some 1,900 and 1,650 dollars per head in 1992, respectively) are 
considered poor.    18
As regards economic performance, backwardness has no easy solution, for it 
does not present a real problem to begin with. The consistency between behavioral 
routines and psychological patterns demonstrates that the existing situation may not be 
considered attractive by those living in developed societies. Nevertheless, it turns out to 
be in step with the preferences of most agents living in that (undeveloped) community
26. 
This contributes to explaining the persistence of poverty as well as of actual or potential 
political instability in undeveloped countries
27. But contrary to what is commonly 
maintained, poverty is generated by the impossibility and even the unsuitability of 
reforms designed to introduce new behavioral routines.  
 
Oppressed countries 
The case examined above constrasts with what is observed in oppressed 
countries, where behavioural routines are the results of psychological patterns filtered 
through exogenous constraints. Put differently, in this context individuals are prevented 
from pursuing their own preferences by more or less systematic violations of their 
freedom. Therefore, they adapt to the external constraints. Adaptation can of course 
generate different behavioural routines, following the nature of the agents. For instance, 
some might try to abandon the exploited groups and join or collude with the winning 
rent-seekers (the ‘oppressors’). Others might choose to form new coalitions with the 
purpose of ousting the incumbents, either to replace them or to carry out deep 
institutional change
28. The majority probably just gives in, and tries to carry out small-
                                                 
26 A testable experiment is the observation of migrants to developed countries. Resistance to accept the 
routines prevailing in the new country reveals unchanging habits, i.e. persisting genetic architecture 
geared to the rules of the game prevailing in the (backward) country of origin. Then, difficulties in 
integration and repeated attempts to game the system (possibly through crime) should be correlated with 
the undeveloped nature of the country of origin.  
27 In particular, political instability has two sources. One is related to the exploitation of envy by political 
competitors. For the reasons explained in the text, incumbent politicians are unlikely to enact policies that 
make higher living standards possible. If they did, they would be voted out systematically. The lack of 
action by incumbents combined with envy leads to frequent changes of leadership. On the other hand, 
incumbents may choose to establish a totalitarian regime, which can survive by creating rent-seeking 
practices to the benefit of ethnic or family supporters. In turn, the accumulation of substantial rents 
creates incentives to stage a coup. In this case the regime remains the same (totalitarianism), but the 
ruling elite is replaced.   
28 The first case is the ‘palace coup’, not unlike what happens in undeveloped countries. While the latter 
is a change of regime – say, from dictatorship to democracy.     19
scale rent-seeeking; or dodge the system by diving into the so-called informal sector; or 
cheat and take as many free rides as possible.  
Not surprisingly, who does what depends on a variety of variables that reflect 
individual propensities – e.g. risk aversion, entrepreneurial spirits, ambition – rather 
than moral standards. That explains why in oppressed countries there appear different 
behavioral routines, even if the formal rules of the game and the psychological patterns 
are the same
29. Clearly, oppressed countries can be high- or low-income economies, 
depending upon the moment in history when oppression is introduced. They can be 
growing or stagnating, following how oppression affects entrepreneurship and 
exchange; and be characterized by both stable and unstable political systems, as a result 
of the prevailing attitudes, perceptions, ability of the rent-seeking coalitions to secure 
power through the exercise of violence.  
 
Transition  
Finally, a situation of transition occurs when (i) psychological patterns are no 
longer consistent with the external environment and (ii) individuals agree on common 
behavioural routines that either make the existing formal environment irrelevant, or are 
judged adequate to justify and obtain environmental change. That applies of course to 
the recent experience of some countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where transition 
has been considered a desirable phenomenon. But it also pertains to less desirable 
contexts, such as – for instance – the transition from the Weimar Republic to Nazi 
Germany. And can also give way to rather confused situations, say when the ex ante 
consensus on the new behavioral routines (e.g. capitalism) turns out to be an exercise in 
wishful thinking.  
 
 
                                                 
29 Once again, culture refers to the existence of common psychological patterns. But these may stay alive 
with – and originate – different behavioral routines, either because of distinct incentives systems 
(normally across countries), or because of different individual features (personalities).    20
8. Explanation and prediction through the extended institutional approach – two 
examples 
Developed economies and the welfare state 
A developed country has been defined as one where behavioral routines are 
consistent with the agents’ psychological patterns. There is no ‘moral problem’; and 
dissatisfaction relates more to the distribution of income within the community or the 
country, rather than to overall income and wealth. In other words, within this context 
envy targets other individuals within the country, not other systems. Let us now apply 
this notion to formulate conjectures about the future of state intervention in the EU area.  
Mainstream law and economics offers a straightforward solution. As long as it is 
apparent that the state production of private goods is inefficient
30, state intervention 
must be reformed following a relatively simple process. Property rights should be 
transferred to private producers in order to maximize efficiency. Some (regulatory) 
rights would nevertheless retained by public authorities in order to compensate for the 
so-called ‘market failures’. Further rights to people’s income and/or wealth would be 
handed out to the state authorities in order to enact redistribution and maximize a 
previously defined social welfare function.  
As argued in earlier, the alternative focuses on behavioral routines, which in this 
case consist of the agents’ revealed attitudes towards political and bureaucratic 
intervention. Although generalizations are always dangerous, an evolutionary approach 
suggests that state interference is perceived in two different ways. On the one hand there 
exist developed EU countries – like Denmark or Finland – where the interaction 
between the state as a producer and a redistributor on the one hand, and the individual 
on the other, is cooperative rather than conflicting. When this applies, the state is 
acknowledged to meet the need for collective insurance against – say – illness, 
unemployment, old age, education. These needs are clearly perceived and widely shared 
to more or less the same degree by these populations. No value judgment comes into the 
                                                 
30 By and large, inefficient production has three different explanations. First, elected politicians and 
lifetime state employees are only loosely responsible to residual claimants and thus present weaker 
incentives to perform and satisfy demand. Second, in the public sector the residual claimant is the 
taxpayer, against whom violence can be applied legally. Finally, state producers can often enhance their 
market power by restricting entry, so that rents are created and maintained.    21
picture, and the state meets such need as if it were some sort of expansion of what 
already experienced at a local-community level. Free riding by the consumers (say, 
unjustified consumption of public health services) or by producers (shirking or 
corruption by state employees) is minimized by deeply rooted and self-reinforcing 
moral standards
31, which frequently translate into collective monitoring and lead to 
moral sanctions (shame) for those who misbehave. Thus, in this category of situations 
the favorable attitude to the welfare state stems from psychological patterns that 
originate from the deliberate search for collective solutions to individual problems. 
They are deeply rooted in collective moral standards: and therefore the ensuing 
behavioral routines are widely legitimized.  
On the other hand, in most other areas of Continental Europe, more or less large 
groups of citizens might profit from state intervention and welfare-state action
32. In all 
such cases the state is then considered as an opportunity by means of which one can 
exploit others. And it is therefore welcome. At the same time, however, it is regarded as 
an intruder and a potential threat to one’s own well-being. As a result, in these countries 
the attitude towards the state depends on whether one considers himself a winner or a 
loser – or both at the same time - within the rent-seeking game. Surely, hardly anybody 
would regard it as an instrument of cooperation in order to attain shared goals. 
If the above holds true one may then conclude that the welfare state is a 
component of a developed economy in a rather limited number of cases. In the majority 
                                                 
31 Self-reinforcing through state education, which underlines the sense of national belonging and the need 
to preserve social cohesion at a local and national level.  
32 Explaining why this applies in some countries rather than others is beyond the scope of this paper. 
Three possible avenues of investigation can however be suggested, although none of them will be pursued 
any further. One regards the role of religious hierarchies. It could be argued that in many European 
regions religious authorities provided and enforced the behavioral rules that made social interaction 
possible and sometimes even prosperous. Sanctions were credible, and extended beyond life, if not to 
eternity. In other areas religious influence was weaker and social interaction had to rely on agree-upon 
ethical rules monitored by the parties involved and enforced by means of informal rules (including 
ostracism). When the influence of religion declined, behavioral rules had to be replaced by formal legal 
arrangements, except for those areas where alternative arrangements were already in place and deeply 
rooted in individuals. If so, the different psychological approach towards social institutions explains the 
different way the welfare state is perceived across the various communities.  
  Other possibilities relate to the way the state is perceived since its role in the so-called Western 
Civilization began to increase. In many areas the state was the result of foreign occupation or political 
transformation, as in the case of the French Revolution. In these cases the civil service was considered to 
be both an intruder and an exploiting agent, either to be resisted or to be fooled; but never to cooperate 
with.  Other circumstances led to a growth of the state as a consequence of conflict, whereby the state 
rapidly increased in size during wartime, but failed to go back to its previous dimensions afterwards. 
Once a gain, it emerged as a top-down process often times driven by selected interest groups.   22
of situations its presence reveals a status of backwardness, whereby behavioral routines 
are consistent with psychological patterns, but individual are nevertheless dissatisfied 
about the outcome. Paradoxically, the inefficient welfare state has little legitimacy, but 
it is nevetheless accepted, and sometimes actively supported. Indeed, the incentives to 
reform it are limited. As a result, many so-called advanced countries would be trapped 
in a state of backwardness featuring a welfare state that is going to be contained for 
budgetary reasons, but not reduced. Indeed, they would belong to the undeveloped bloc, 
following our categories.  
Surely, there would be little to do, other than identifying those areas of state 
intervention that might be outside the prevailing patterns, recommend reform so as to 
reduce abuses, suggest amendments that allow minorities to opt out of tax-financed 
programs of government-produced services, or to choose with their feet and migrate 
towards existing or newly-created institutional systems that are consistent with 
psychological patterns usually disregarded in larger jurisdictions. On a grander scale, 
one could try to alter the prevailing psychological routines. That is where the battle for 
ideologies plays a key role and what motivates – for instance – think tanks. 
 
Institution building after communism 
The downfall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe has tempted 
neoclassical scholars of all trades by giving them the illusion of accessing a green field 
context where the best possible social rules could be exported and effectively 
enforced
33. There was a question of timing, which led to the debate between shock 
therapy and gradualism. And there was a question of substance, which mainstream L&E 
solved by offering instructions to create and assign property rights, subject to efficient 
regulation and a vaguely-defined welfare state – the latter being partially justified by the 
need to buy consensus from those expected to favor or regret the old regime.  
These pages emphasize the need to focus on the nature of the post-Soviet 
economies before getting dragged into fine-tuning debates. In particular, it should be 
                                                 
33 Social scientists frequently devote their skills to such exercises. In recent times constitutional scholars 
have been drafting perfect rules for countless African and Latin American countries, following the 
example of Rousseau on Corsica. With very few exceptions, their lack of knowledge about the countries 
and populations involved never seemed to be a strong enough reason for restraint.    23
observed that some of these countries came from a condition of oppression that evolved 
into transition as soon as the dictatorship collapsed. Whereas others seemed to feature a 
condition of backwardness, rather than of transition. If so, the end of communism in the 
latter group of economies had very little impact on the behavioural routines – including 
those relevant for economic performance. In these (backward) countries the behavioral 
routines observed under communism were indeed consistent with the underlying 
psychological patterns. Individuals were not particularly happy with their own state of 
affairs. But they had adapted to the existing institutional context, had accepted the 
operating property-right distribution and were willing to play games with the system in 
order to maximize their perceived rents and thus their welfare. In short, their 
psychological patterns were structured on systematic rent-seeking and refusal of 
responsibility. Their behavioural routines reflected this broad attitude. Different rules of 
the game were not only rejected, but hardly conceived.  
One suspects that in these cases efforts to introduce capitalism were and are 
bound to fail, for all the rules that characterise a free-market system are likely to be 
shaped or turned into rent-seeking and rent-sharing opportunities. For example, 
reputation did matter in the pre-1989 world. But within a competitive system reputation 
is upheld erga omnes, both inside the outside the group. Instead, within communism 
interaction is mainly among groups and coalitions, so that reputation matters only 
within the coalition or when one acts on behalf of the coalition. That explains why the 
change of political regime hardly mattered (and matters). The state remains a countepart 
that provides and enforces privileges in exchange for loyalty and/or bribes. Therefore, 
there is nothing wrong in playing games with it or cheating. Not suprisingly, new 
constitutional designs are perceived as the foundation of new sets of privileges, rather 
than as a guardian of the rule of law, competition, individual responsibility. According 
to Sachs et al. (2000), this is indeed what happened in Russia – but not in China or 
Vietnam - when capitalism was introduced.  
Nevertheless, there is still hope for post-communist prosperity in undeveloped 
countries. Whereas totalitarian regimes made it relatively difficult for residents to 
interact with foreigners, post-Soviet political systems (and communication technology) 
are relatively open and allow contacts with individuals featuring different psychological 
patterns, whose behavioural routines are not only sustainable, but also more attractive.   24
Imitation follows and may engender new psychological routines that eventually conflict 
and/or accelerate behavioural change on a grand scale. When that happens, transition 
takes off.  
On the other hand, it is here claimed that in those economies that are today 
regarded as more or less successful transition countries – among which the Baltic 
republics, Hungary, Slovenia, Poland – individuals during the communist period 
succeeded in preserving their original patterns. Between the late 1940s and 1989 people 
adapted to the new political circumstances (oppression) and therefore changed their 
behavioral routines. But did not find it difficult to revert to more congenial blueprints 
once communism collapsed. For instance, and contrary to what experienced elsewhere, 
gaming the communist state yesterday was not the same as cheating the state today. 
Bribing was once admitted to make oppression bearable; but less so today, when 
political oppression has been removed.  
Of course, this does not necessarily imply that in transition countries individuals 
are systematically devoted to free-market principles. Indeed, rent-seeking is even openly 
justified on the basis of nationalistic ideology, much as in the XIXth and XXth 
centuries. The notion of self-responsibility is also ambiguous and closer to the western-
European versions of socialism, rather than to the Anglo-American ideal of freedom. 
That may shed light on why countries that performed more or less the same under 
communism – say, Bulgaria and Poland, or Belarus and Estonia, respectively – have 
been doing very differently in the post-communist period. And also makes it easier to 
predict the future of the transition countries properly defined, which at the beginning is 
likely to be consistent with the prevailing psychological patterns transmitted through –  
and inherited from – the communist period. In particular, these countries may be 
expected to be heading towards some sort of quasi-liberal society, where various 
ideologies – be it nationalism, national cohesion or solidarity – persist and justify rents, 
infringements upon property rights. Growth will remain disappointing, though – at least 
for a while. But the rise in incomes is likely to gain momentum in the future, as long as 
the new generations adapt the old routines to the new circumstances and are not enticed 
by the ethics and the illusions of the European superstate that currently seems to seduce 
so many Westerners.   
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9. Concluding remarks 
The undisputed early success of traditional law and economics has several origins. 
Economists were happy since the various versions of the L&E approach put forward  
apparently satisfactory explanations to poor economic performance, thereby 
complementing the contributions offered by the (new) institutional scholars. At the 
same time, it contributed to filling some of the gaps left open by neoclassical analysis – 
the role of transactions costs and property-rights allocation - and seemed to elaborate an 
easy way around individual preferences. Law scholars were also happy, since L&E 
promised to draw a clear-cut divide between economic performance and a Rawlsian 
notion of justice; and at the same time allowed to attain efficient solutions without 
giving up fairness (compensation would do the trick).  
Nevertheless, recent contributions have convincingly argued that the economic 
ground on which orthodox L&E is built is fragile. Surely, the explanatory power of this 
new branch of the social sciences remains considerable. Property-right assignments and 
violations have important economic consequences on human behaviour. But that does 
not necessarily justify regulatory or teleological policies.   
This article has maintained that evolutionary psychology can further enhance the 
explanatory power of the L&E approach by giving operational content to the obvious 
fact that human beings do not behave like robots. And that their way of thinking plays a 
crucial role in order to understand behaviour, both individually and collectively. Indeed, 
human actions reflect not only cost-benefit analyses based on monetary flows, but also 
ideology, emotions and the external stimuli people are confronted with. Hence, ‘good 
law-making’ might not always lead to the expected outcome, unless the interaction 
between the software of the mind and the outside stimuli are properly understood. Thus, 
problem-solving is no longer a matter of  efficiency and optimization, but rather of 
adaptation.   
From an institutional standpoint the evolutionary vision further suggests that 
there is no such thing as a desirable set of rules (a constitution). The very scope for 
developing some sort of public-choice-based dynamics of organizations and coalitions   26
seems to be weakened, too
34; and replaced by the need to develop a theory of interaction 
between psychological patterns and behavioural routines induced by external constraints 
that may or may not be accompanied by specific ideologies, belief systems
35. A 
potential example is provided by the European Union, a bureaucratic superstate that 
nevertheless embodies symbols and myths that seem to provide a much longed-for reply 
to the sense of unsatisfaction felt by many Europeans. In this case predicting the future 
of the EU institutions requires an understanding of what should be done for the EU to 
fulfil people’s expectations and to what extent and how fast the bureaucratic superstate 
can alter people’s way of thinking, so that they might accept from a federal government 
a degree of dirigisme which would have been unacceptable at a local level.  
The above does not rule out top-down constitutional engineering and Chicago-
style assignments of property rights altogether. Rather, these solutions become a 
particular case of a general L&E approach, and apply when the current psychological 
patterns originate relatively weak spontaneous behavioural routines for lack of 
references to pre-existing neural frames
36.  
By applying this conceptual framework to the analysis of post-communist 
countries it has been observed that most post-communist reformers, including several 
international agencies, assumed (i) that capitalism would have been built on barren and 
thus highly receptive ground, and (ii) that free-markey reforms were meeting the 
preferences of most individuals in post-communist countries. It has been argued that 
those observers were wrong on both accounts. That explains why the assignment of new 
property rights combined with the creation of a modern legal system – generally dubbed 
as ‘rule of law’ - made sure that post-communist policy-making ended up in a wide 
range of different outcomes.  
                                                 
34 At most, there is room for a theory of political dynamics regarding – say – the nature and evolution of 
democratic or totalitarian regimes, especially in the presence of tensions between psychological patterns 
and behavioral routines. And there is also room for studying the dynamics of successful rules – i.e. those 
that reflect shared behavioral patterns. The ultimate goal is of course to shed light on the agents’ way of 
thinking, the mechanisms that shape the legitimacy of a rule and the acceptance of a norm.     
35 Once again, it may be worth reminding that the evolutionary approach may yield different results when 
applied to culture and to psychological patterns. For cultural traits may change relatively rapidly as a 
consequence of external constraints. Behavioral routines will reflect these phenomena.  
36 This follows from the Law of Law’s Leverage (Jones 2000, p.2101), whereby rule making is more 
likely to bring forth expected rational responses, the less the human mind is conditioned by previous 
experiences or by emotions related to previous experiences.    27
In the end, there seem to exist strong reasons to maintain that ‘decision makers 
should allow free choice of law, as in allowing arbitration in contracts’ (Rubin 2005)
37. 
The state would not necessarily disappear, but finds its legitimacy in some kind of 
contract, to which individuals are subject only if they have explicitly accepted it, or at 
least not opted out of.  
                                                 
37 History shows that efficient legal systems are not the outcome of scholarly design, but of competition 
among legal systems. Indeed, too much faith in scholarly or judiciary design ultimately favors rent-
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